REMEDIES SYMPOSIUM

ON CRITICAL JUNCTURES, INTERCURRENCE, AND
DYNAMIC POLITICAL ORDERS
Paul Baumgardner ∗
Over the past two decades, national and state governments have
struggled to find suitable remedies for harms perpetrated against religious
adherents and institutions, as well as harms perpetrated by religious
adherents and institutions. At the core of these fights surrounding the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the
Constitution, the national Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
and state RFRAs are legitimate questions about the status of religious
rights in the twenty-first century, the limiting principles on religious
rights, and the types of political frameworks available for balancing
religious rights and other valued individual and collective rights.
To address these complex questions, judges and scholars should
investigate several larger developments in American politics, most
notably the dynamics that are reconstructing our nation’s church-state
order. A wise first step in this investigation would be to track the various
judicial, legislative, and social movement actions of the past several
decades that implicate and contest the myriad forms of religious authority,
right, and privilege in the United States. This step promises to supply a
useful lens for evaluating the diverse, interwoven, and confrontational
harms, claims, and liberty interests within our church-state order, while
also helping to make sense of the controversies that will likely surround
religious rights statutes and court cases in the future.
This article represents an initial theoretical sketch of such an
investigative step. Although introductory by nature, this piece promises to
initiate a longer and richer empirical undertaking, one in which greater
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attention will be paid to the sociological detail and lived texture of these
broad, developmental accounts. 1
Relying on contemporary historical-institutionalist literature
concerning processes of American political development, I argue that the
nebulous status of religious rights is largely a recent phenomenon—the
result of one coalition (centered around rights protections for the LGBTQ
community) growing and making important strides at the same time that
a separate “religious rights” coalition attempts to push beyond a
disorienting critical juncture.
I. CRITICAL JUNCTURES
To understand the political challenges (and minefields of potential
legal harms) surrounding religious rights in the twenty-first century, let’s
first begin in 1963. In that year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Sherbert
v. Verner that the state could not substantially burden Adell Sherbert’s
free exercise of religion unless it proved that there was a compelling
interest justifying the burden and that the state was applying the least
restrictive means in achieving its compelling interest. 2 The test developed
in this case—the Sherbert test—stood for decades as the touchstone for
cases pertaining to the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.
The Sherbert test aspired to find a balance between government interests
and citizens’ religious freedom. The history of the Sherbert test
demonstrates how hard federal courts worked to apply the test
evenhandedly, so that neither the state nor religious adherents were
structurally disadvantaged by its application. 3
However, nearly three decades later, the applicability and reach of
Sherbert was drastically circumscribed. In Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court
constructed a separate test for adjudicating religious free exercise cases.4
Instead of asking whether the Native American claimants in the case had

1. For instance, in the statutes and cases explored in this article, the number of parties expressing liberty interests, claiming to have been harmed, and/or expecting future harm are legion,
including religious adherents, religious institutions, women, members of the LGBTQ community,
non-religious citizens, and several states. Further research, on the basis of this article, plans to introduce the valuable and discrete offerings of these different political actors.
2. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec, & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Court:
Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. OF CHURCH AND ST. 237-62 (2004); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS
EQUALITY (2008).
4. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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been burdened by the relevant Oregon state law, the Court deemed other
queries to be more constitutionally germane. If a burden had existed, it
would then need to be determined whether the state had a compelling
interest justifying the burden and had employed narrowly tailored means
in achieving its interest. For instance, is the state law neutral and generally
applicable? If so, the Court reasoned, then it usually will pass
constitutional muster. 5
Smith showcased a critical juncture within the church-state order of
the United States. As historical-institutional political scientists such as
Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen have argued, critical junctures
are rare occurrences within political development. These large
institutional disruptions produce several significant outcomes, namely:
The range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands
substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of
interest are potentially much more momentous. Contingency, in other
words, becomes paramount. 6

The Supreme Court’s actions in Smith surprised many legal
observers because it profoundly changed the church-state order in the
United States. Moments of abrasion and disagreement between religious
entities and state entities have always pervaded American life, but the
Smith decision was distinct. The ruling promulgated a foreign set of
principles for negotiating instances of church-state conflict. Smith’s
reinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause represented a fundamental
reworking of the constitutional standards, rights expectations, and
claimant positions surrounding religious exercise. Whereas under the
Sherbert test, the onus was on the state to explain and justify its acts once
a burden on religious exercise was uncovered, the Smith test flipped the
script. Under the new general applicability test, it was incumbent on
religious adherents to demonstrate how a government act was biased or
applied unequally to a particular religious exercise or exerciser. It was
only when such a high threshold of bias and unequal treatment was found

5. Id. at 881 (arguing that only a unique, hybridized religious rights claim could bring the
constitutional scope of a neutral and generally applicable law into question) (“The only decisions in
which this Court has held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable
law to religiously motivated action are distinguished on the ground that they have involved not the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but that Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.”).
6. Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, THE STUDY OF CRITICAL JUNCTURES:
THEORY, NARRATIVE, AND COUNTERFACTUALS IN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM, 59 WORLD
POLITICS 341, 343 (2007); See also PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND
SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004).
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that the Sherbert test would be triggered and investigation into the
compelling interest of the state would commence. 7
Incidentally, the critical juncture facing the church-state order in the
United States also was visible in the increasingly unsettled area of
Establishment Clause case law. What did and did not qualify as
“respecting an establishment of religion” became an unnavigable morass.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a standalone nativity scene in a
county courthouse was unconstitutional, but a large menorah set next to a
Christmas tree was constitutional. 8 A Christian group using public school
property for proselytism, hymn singing, and religious events was
acceptable, but a short, non-denominational benediction given at a public
high school graduation was beyond the pale. 9 A student reading a prayer
before a public high school football violated the Establishment Clause,
but a chaplain opening municipal meetings with a prayer did not.10 And,
for good measure, what of the Decalogue? Well, that depended on
whether the Commandments were etched into a massive granite
monument on the grounds of a state capitol (constitutional) or were one
part of a multifarious exhibit at two county courthouses
(unconstitutional). 11
During the exact same period in which Smith was jeopardizing the
status quo of religious exercise, the Supreme Court provided mixed
signals to lower courts and laymen alike on the matter of religious
establishment. The Justices could not agree on the relevant political
principles or legal standards motivating their decision-making: How much
should we, as a nation, venerate strict separation between church and
state? What about non-preferentialism between religious groups? Or
religious accommodation? Did the First Amendment outline a
constitutional duty to eradicate forms of religious coercion? Or did the
Constitution only bar state endorsement of religion? And did the setting,
audience, or history of a practice change the constitutional calculus? The
Court vacillated, leaving the boundaries of religious rights uncertain.
Remarkably, this critical juncture did not transition quickly or easily
into a clear, determinate, or path-dependent settlement within America’s

7. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
8. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
9. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992).
10. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway,
134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
11. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S.
844 (2005).

2018]

CRITICAL JUNCTURES

69

church-state order. The Smith decision was met with resounding
contempt, both in civil society and in the halls of government. A bipartisan
Congress aimed to codify this constitutional backlash in the form of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The explicit purpose behind
this statute was to return to the church-state order of the pre-Smith period.
This was to be accomplished by reestablishing the Sherbert test as the
operative standard for “all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened.” 12 Passed with an overwhelming degree of
support in both houses of Congress and then signed into law by President
Clinton, this national RFRA effectively swooped in to unsettle Smith and
reassert the Sherbert test as the standard that “applies to all Federal law,
and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise.” 13
However, the RFRA was not on the books for four years before the
Supreme Court sharply limited the scope of the statute. In City of Boerne
v. Flores, the Supreme Court ruled that the RFRA did not apply to state
and local governments. 14 In response, dozens of states spearheaded efforts
to apply the Sherbert test to the states, oftentimes through legislative
proposals to implement their own state RFRAs. 15
Throughout this order indeterminacy, one distinct legal
consciousness has emerged, intent on entrenching a particular agenda and
rights regime. 16 This legal consciousness is animated by a commitment to
12. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–3 (1993).
14. Cty. of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
15. To date, at least 21 states have passed state RFRAs. See, National Conference of State
Legislatures, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/6LZN-GUGG].
16. By legal consciousness, I mean to connote the phenomenological character of the law in
relation to the legal subject, namely, the orientation one has both when imagining and experiencing
the present legal system and examining future constructions of that system. As sociologists Patricia
Ewick and Susan S. Silbey explain, legal consciousness concerns the “patterned, stabilized, and objectified” set of legal “meanings” that constitute and make sense of the law. PATRICIA EWICK &
SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 39 (1998). According to Ewick and Silbey:
In this theoretical framing of legal consciousness as participation in the construction of
legality, consciousness is not an exclusively ideational, abstract, or decontextualized set
of attitudes toward and about the law. Consciousness is not merely a state of mind. Legal
consciousness is produced and revealed in what people do as well as what they say. In this
sense, consciousness is . . . constituted and expressed in the practical knowledge individuals have of social life. Consciousness is discursively deployed as reflexive consideration
about day-to-day activities; it is also tacitly enacted as competent social action.
Id. at 46; see also Paul Baumgardner, Kennedy, Consciousness, and the Monostructural Account of
the American Legal Order, UNBOUND: HARV. J. OF THE LEGAL LEFT, Vol. X (2015); Erik D.
Fritsvold, Under the Law: Legal Consciousness and Radical Environmental Activism, 34 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY Issue 4 (Fall 2009).
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a robust right to free exercise, which entails limited government
interference in religious practices and heightened deference to the dictates
of conscience and the prerogatives of religious institutions. Relatedly, this
consciousness champions a less-than-robust Establishment Clause, in the
name of maintaining the cultural importance of visible religion.
According to this consciousness, religion—equipped with its language,
symbols, and other material trappings—should be allowed a conspicuous
and salutary presence in American life.
It would be fair to argue that this consciousness has united and driven
a nebulous coalition of religious adherents, institutions, conservative
interest groups, and activists. If this particular legal consciousness is not
sufficiently institutionalized—which, at the very least, indicates
translation into the laws, legal practices, and judicial standards
surrounding religious free exercise and religious establishment—the
coalition worries that religious adherents and institutions will be
susceptible to extensive political harm. For this reason, the coalition has
become an active presence in American law and politics. It has played an
instrumental role in lobbying and litigation efforts surrounding the
national and state RFRAs, and coalition forces also have been at the
forefront of defending the public role of religion in American life. 17
II. INTERCURRENCE
Since Smith was handed down in 1990, exposing and broadening a
rift in the church-state order within this country, other key political orders
within the United States have experienced separate (yet, as we will see,
deeply connected) developments. One of the most significant order
developments concerns the recognition and expansion of constitutional
rights for members of the LGBTQ community.
Thirty-two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court found Georgia’s
sodomy laws to be constitutionally valid. 18 Since that time, however, a
legal consciousness related to the protection of LGBTQ rights has formed
in the United States. This consciousness has stressed the manners in which
virtues of fairness, equality, justice, toleration, and compassion demand a
reconsideration of the rights afforded to members of the LGBTQ
community. Numerous legal and political science scholars have detailed
the changing public attitudes surrounding the LGBTQ community,

17. See ANDREW R. LEWIS, THE RIGHTS TURN IN CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN POLITICS: HOW
ABORTION TRANSFORMED THE CULTURE WARS (2017).
18. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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including the courthouse victories for the community. However, little
attention has been paid to the legal consciousness behind these recent
rights recognitions or to the manner in which this legal consciousness has
interacted with and grated against other legal consciousnesses in the
United States. During the exact same period in which (1) Smith and
Sherbert redux were seesawing, (2) Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause interpretations were shifting, (3) RFRAs began to
be debated at the national and state levels, and (4) the general state of the
church-state order in America was up in the air, the progressive legal
consciousness surrounding LGBTQ rights grew and started making
landmark strides.
Lest all this talk of critical junctures, consciousnesses, and orders has
come across as an unduly abstract presentation of contemporary American
political developments, let’s reground these radical evolutions. It is
essential to keep in mind how both of these legal consciousnesses
bubbling up from the 1990s to the present have been promulgated,
developed, and enacted by diverse coalitions and support structures. In the
same way that religious rights forces have mobilized in the wake of Smith,
it has demanded an incredible amount of time, money, manpower, legal
aid, and movement strength to take down state sodomy laws, unsettle the
Defense of Marriage Act, advance the state and national cases for samesex marriage, and craft anti-discrimination statutes through multiple
institutional avenues. 19
Some might argue that the most fascinating feature of these
concurrent order developments relates to the radical contingency and
inessential antagonism involved in the meeting of these opposing
movement forces. These coalitions originally were motivated by legal
consciousnesses not intrinsically in competition or even directly oriented
towards the same universe of legal harms. However, it is important to note
how these two different coalitions—each equipped with disparate support
structures and united by discrete legal consciousnesses (which themselves
were directed towards dissimilar rights regimes)—were in the process of
reconstructing independent yet historically proximate orders. 20

19. NATHANIEL FRANK, AWAKENING: HOW GAYS AND LESBIANS BROUGHT MARRIAGE
EQUALITY TO AMERICA (2017); JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE
EQUALITY (2014); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions
on LGBT Rights, 43 L. & SOC. REV., 1 (2009); CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS,
ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).
20. Through a rich combination of (1) a motivating legal consciousness (linked to a particularly
privileged rights regime), (2) coalitional strength, and (3) a support structure that enabled mobilization, these forces sought to reconstruct their respective political orders.
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The dynamic workings of these two different coalitions have
generated a state of intercurrence between the church-state order (which
was the chief target of influence for the religious rights coalition) and the
politico-sexual order (which was the chief target of influence for the
LGBTQ coalition). In short, as these two coalitions have influenced their
respective political orders over the past several decades, the developing
church-state order and politico-sexual order have themselves exerted
immense, contrasting pressure on one another. 21
In their classic work of historical-institutionalist scholarship, The
Search for American Political Development, political scientists Karen
Orren and Stephen Skowronek describe the confrontational character of
such intercurrence:
Intercurrence depicts the organization of the polity seen strictly from a
historical institutional point of view. It directs researchers to locate the
historical construction of politics in the simultaneous operation of older
and newer instruments of governance, in controls asserted through multiple orderings of authority whose coordination with one another cannot
be assumed and whose outward reach and impingements, including on
one another, are inherently problematic. 22

The activities of the religious rights coalition and the LGBTQ
coalition since 1990 have led to a dialectic between the American churchstate order and the American politico-sexual order on various institutional
fronts, and these orders continue to collide in the most acrimonious of
ways, constructing—along the way—uncharted and unclear frontiers of
legal harm and remedy.
Many of these dialectical encounters have been designed quite
consciously. Into the early 2010s, although state RFRAs were getting
passed (generally with bipartisan support), some of the most attentiongrabbing efforts by the religious rights coalition to procure remedies for
21. In Institutions and Intercurrence: Theory Building In The Fullness Of Time, Karen Orren
And Stephen Skowronek outline how this phenomenon of intercurrence will include:
Replacing the expectation of an ordered space bounded in synchronized time with the expectation of a politicized push and pull arrayed around multiple institutional arrangements
with diverse historical origins. With this image of the political universe in view, attention
is directed to the ways in which different ordering principles converge, collide, and fold
onto one another.
Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Institutions and Intercurrence: Theory Building In The Fullness
Of Time, 38 NOMOS 138 (1996).
22. KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 113 (2004).
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violations of statutory and constitutional religious rights included issues
perceived as threatening to the LGBTQ coalition. When the Christian
Legal Society tried to become a university-sanctioned student
organization at the University of California, Hastings College of Law, it
was rejected on the grounds that the Society was discriminatory towards
LGBTQ students. 23 The Christian Legal Society sued the school, and by
the time the case had wormed its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, both the
religious rights coalition and the LGBTQ coalition had lined up to support
their respective sides.
From the perspective of many active within or sympathetic to the
LGBTQ coalition, it seems as if a large number of the purported advances
in religious liberty have had the larger effect of safeguarding believers’
freedom to discriminate against traditionally marginalized persons. Two
years after Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a unanimous Supreme
Court ruled that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses protect
religious institutions against employment discrimination lawsuits brought
by their religious leaders and teachers (in this case, a disabled woman who
occasionally taught religion courses at a Lutheran school).24 In 2014, the
high court interpreted the national RFRA with such breadth that Hobby
Lobby Stores are not legally required to supply basic contraceptive
services to thousands of its female employees. 25 A year later, a county
clerk in Kentucky even relied on her religious beliefs to justify her refusal
to sign marriage licenses for same-sex couples. 26 The clerk, Kim Davis,
remarked: “To issue a marriage license which conflicts with God’s
definition of marriage, with my name affixed to the certificate, would
violate my conscience . . . I have no animosity toward anyone and harbor
no ill will. To me this has never been a gay or lesbian issue. It is about
marriage and God’s word.” 27 A dominant worry within the evolving

23. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). The Christian Legal Society’s
stated beliefs and mission were opposed to homosexuality and homosexual behavior, and the Society
did not permit students who were living in opposition to the Society’s tenets to be active members.
Id.
24. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
25. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see also Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct.
1557 (2016).
26. Eugene Volokh, When does your religion legally excuse you from doing part of your job?,
WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/09/04/when-does-your-religion-legally-excuse-you-from-doing-part-of-yourjob/?utm_term=.c3467b13b365 [https://perma.cc/3NUV-PFXZ].
27. Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Licenses,
Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/43XC-CJGQ].
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American politico-sexual order is that the religious rights coalition is only
interested in finding suitable remedies for harms perpetrated against
religious adherents and institutions; the coalition is not concerned with
avoiding harm to women, the disabled, or members of the LGBTQ
community. 28
However, from the perspective of many active within or sympathetic
to the religious rights coalition, the progressive legal consciousness
surrounding LGBTQ rights has obtained a frightening degree of
institutional recognition in the United States. Over the course of only 12
years, anti-sodomy laws were struck down as unconstitutional, 29 DOMA
was eviscerated, 30 California’s Proposition 8 was buried, 31 multiple states
elected to recognize same-sex marriage, and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the U.S. Constitution guaranteed the right of marriage to all same-sex
couples across the country. 32 A common view within the religious right
coalition is that these recent constitutional gains for the LGBTQ
community are ever expanding and even imperialistic, effectively
crowding out space for religious observance (particularly for faith
communities that do not condone LGBTQ rights, identities, behaviors,
practices, etc.). Moreover, legal protections for the LGBTQ community
actually are forcing religious adherents into actions that they are
religiously opposed to performing. 33 As such, a dominant worry within
the evolving American church-state order is that the LGBTQ coalition is
only interested in finding suitable remedies for harms perpetrated against
the LGBTQ community; the coalition is not concerned with avoiding
harm to the rights, beliefs, and practices of religious adherents and
institutions.
III. MOVING FORWARD?
Although it would be unnecessarily apocalyptic to claim that the
intercurrence between these two political orders has reached a legal zerosum point—where one order is demonstrably harmed by each gain
enjoyed by the other order—the rhetoric surrounding present legal
28. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Gay rights groups withdraw support of ENDA after Hobby Lobby
decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-decision/?utm_term=.b746e0136790 [http://perma.cc/G54T-YJA9].
29. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
30. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
31. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
33. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
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struggles for religious rights and LGBTQ rights certainly could lead a
casual observer to this conclusion.
A clear example of this concerns the fate of RFRAs. Whereas the
national RFRA and numerous state RFRA proposals received widespread
support from both parties just a few years ago, more recent efforts to pass
state laws protecting religious rights have generated marked partisan
divisions and intense public scrutiny. When Indiana passed a common
model RFRA in 2015, a groundswell of opposition developed from the
LGBTQ coalition, as well as from corporations, celebrities, and everyday
Americans. Boycotts and protests escalated until additional legislation
assuaged critics. Later attempts to pass state RFRAs in Arkansas, Georgia,
and North Carolina were equally contentious. Seen as offering legal cover
for bigotry, hatred, and discrimination, RFRAs and similar protective
legislation are now regularly talked about as anti-LGBTQ legislation and
government permissions to victimize. 34 At least one state has gone so far
as to take the fight to states with RFRAs. In 2016, California elected to
ban state-supported travel to “states that California believes don’t protect
religious freedoms and states that it says use religious freedom as a basis
of discrimination.” 35
IV.CONCLUSION
The best mechanism for resolving the intercurrence between the
church-state order desired by the religious rights coalition and the
politico-sexual order desired by the LGBTQ coalition is yet to be
discovered. However, much hangs in the balance. If Smith showcased a
critical juncture within the church-state order, the state of religious liberty
appears just as blurry in the wake of religious liberty protection laws
becoming unpopular and legally suspect. Similarly, the LGBTQ coalition
has brought attention to the legal inconsistencies and uncertainties that
continue to affect the LGBTQ community. This includes, but clearly is
not limited to, the proper scope of federal and state anti-discrimination
34. See, e.g., Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return
to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907 (2016); Lucien J. Dhooge, The Impact of State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts: An Analysis of the Interpretive Case Law, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
585 (2017); Jennifer Finney Boylan, The Masterpiece Cakeshop Case Is Not About Religious Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/gay-religious-freedom-cake.html [http://perma.cc/VC5Z-K5KD].
35. Carma Hassan, California adds 4 states to travel ban for laws it says discriminate against
LGBTQ community, CNN (June 23, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/23/us/california-travelban/index.html [https://perma.cc/C24Z-CE5N]; S. Con. Res. 1887, 2015 Gen. Assemb,, Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2016).
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laws in the areas of housing, employment, adoption, public
accommodations, and education.
It is possible that the church-state order and the politico-sexual order
will naturally move out of intercurrence. The religious rights coalition
might fade, morph, and/or become less influential within the church-state
order. The same goes for the LGBTQ coalition as it relates to the politicosexual order. But what if the intercurrence does not go the way of
spontaneous, harmonious reordering. What if the different histories,
agendas, logics, actors, rights regimes, and authority structures within
these orders do not resolve themselves?
Should we then defer to the vicissitudes of a shifting federal
judiciary? Do the top-down remedies flowing from Supreme Court and
lower court decisions even possess the requisite reconciliatory powers for
these orders? Another option would be to entrust the wheels of federalism
with the elimination of any intercurrence harms, or at least to equally
appreciate the competing orders. But do we want different state
authorities—each endowed with unique, local political priorities—to be
responsible for gradually shaping the legal compromises and relative
powers of the church-state order and the politico-sexual order?
Most likely, the explosive intercurrence that we have witnessed
between the church-state order and the politico-sexual order dominant in
the United States is going to have to be directly untangled through a series
of forceful, purposive legal measures. The law has been a substantial force
in restructuring the American church-state order and the politico-sexual
order since 1990 (and certainly well before that). The law should prove to
be a substantial force in future construction as well. But what
constructions will be made and how they will become path dependent are
highly contingent, which seems to augur a continuation of mobilizations
and confrontations from religious rights and LGBTQ coalitions, each
angling to be the authors of the salvific legal measures.

